Ian Goldin, Columnist
Ideology: Left-Independent | Writing from: Washington, DC

On June 28, 2005, nineteen American Special Operations soldiers were killed by Taliban forces in northwestern Afghanistan. It was the largest loss of life in Navy SEAL history. In the midst of the mission, called Operation Red Wing, some local goat herders stumbled upon the SEALs’ hiding place. Because the herders were unarmed and showed no evidence of hostility, the soldiers decided to let them go. They were afraid that if they killed the herders (which they considered the correct military decision), the American media would label them as murderers for breaking the Geneva Convention. Shortly after letting the herders go, the American forces were ambushed by between 80 and 200 Taliban militants. They were overwhelmed by the sheer number of insurgents and enemy firepower, and only one American survived the ordeal.

The only survivor of the operation assumes that the herders told the Taliban about the SEALs’ whereabouts. In his book, he blames American Leftists and the liberal media for forcing the military to adhere to the standards of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan, which led to the decision to let the herders live. Many of the more hawkish conservatives agree with him, and the human rights issues surrounding the War on Terror have been widely debated throughout the conflict. While I understand that it is difficult to adhere to standards of human rights when the other side is murdering innocent civilians indiscriminately, we can’t afford to lower ourselves to the standards of terrorism.

Personally, I find it difficult to feel bad for terrorists when they are denied their individual rights. Someone who terrorizes children hardly deserves a court-martial. However, we can’t win the war if we disregard our commitment to rights and liberties.

Why? Because we cannot win without the support of the tribal leaders and village elders throughout Afghanistan.

It seems like an obvious conclusion, but most people really don’t understand the critical role this factor plays in deciding the outcome of the war.

The Taliban have regained their strongest foothold in the northwestern areas of Afghanistan that run along the Pakistan border, especially those opposite of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Kunar province, where Operation Red Wing was carried out, is in this area.

For years, our goal has been to get Kunar province under control of the Afghan government, but that goal has proven to be elusive. I couldn’t imagine why: Kunar is about 150 miles from Kabul. That may not seem like a lot, but consider the fact that almost 86 percent of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain. There’s basically one road for the entire region. In the mountain villages, where the Taliban are strongest, there are no roads. There is no running water or electricity. They have no telephone wires. The villages consist of huts literally built into the sides of mountains. Essentially, they are ungovernable – from the outside, that is.

The villages in this region have their own form of government with roots much deeper to them than the corrupt Karzai regime. About 95 percent of the inhabitants are Pashtuns, who also happen to make up a majority of the Taliban. Pashtuns have a strict pre-Islamic honor code called Pashtunwali. One of the major tenets of this code is called Badal, or revenge. If there is perceived injustice, members of this ethnic group must take revenge. The saying, “Revenge is a dish best served cold,” is actually a Pashtun saying that was adopted by the British. These guys don’t mess around.

That’s why the American military can’t ignore the rules of engagement and the Geneva Convention. We can’t firebomb a mountain village then expect the inhabitants to happily vote in the next national elections. If we do injustice to Pashtun villagers, we lose the cooperation of village elders and tribal leaders, and the village is lost to the Taliban. The Taliban cannot survive without the support of these kinds of villages.
At the height of the Roman Empire, there were repeated uprisings in Spain, Gaul, and Greece against the Romans because these nations were organized in a way that could be compared to Afghanistan today. Each of these countries were essentially ruled by nobles from different regions, who held the real legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Though the Romans conquered the regions, the people always saw these nobles as the true rulers. Despite Rome’s massive military might, they could never really hold control over these regions. In Afghanistan, the people see the village elders and Tribal leaders as the legitimate leaders, so it’s going to be just as difficult for the Afghan government to maintain influence over the areas beyond Kabul.

India was the same way – it was made up of various principalities with sovereign rulers. The British were able to conquer India with relatively little military force by allying with and gaining the support of the leaders of certain regions, and using the military power of those leaders against the regions it couldn’t take otherwise.

By no means does the United States want to conquer Afghanistan, but if we want to achieve our goals in the region, we should learn from history. We need to do as much as possible to garner the support of tribes and villages to build a coalition united against the Taliban.

It looks like recent attempts at doing that have proven successful – a recent New York Times article highlighted the creation of local militias from former Mujahedeen fighters. President Obama’s new strategy is also a step in the right direction. The troop surge is largely going to be used to strengthen Afghan security forces, which is a way of supporting the tribes that are friendly to us and who are willing to fight the Taliban. In addition, the strategy attempts to shore-up security on the Pakistan border, which will make it harder for the Taliban to escape across the line, where they basically have a safe haven. I just hope it’s not too little too late.