Ian Goldin, Columnist
Ideology: Left-Independent | Writing from: Washington, DC
The title of this article is taken from John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s iconic Christmas/protest song. Although it was recorded in 1971 as a protest of the war in Vietnam, it seems applicable today. In fact, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are constantly compared to the Vietnam War. The prospect of ending the war by simply wanting it is overly simple, but it’s also interestingly poignant. In a way, if the American people really didn’t want to be at war, we wouldn’t. We definitely wouldn’t be in Iraq. Yes, we were originally misled to believe that Saddam had WMDs and was a major threat, but once we found out that wasn’t true, we decided to stay anyway. We were okay with it. Most people agree that at least initial military action in Afghanistan was justified, but we’re still there almost 9 years later. The wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan have become the longest wars in American history. Maybe some Americans want to be at war. I don’t. I want what was our original goal in Iraq and Afghanistan, but what we seem to have lost sight of: American security.
The question is whether our current strategy can provide that. I support President Obama, and I hope that his plan of ‘Clear, Hold, Build’ works. Realistically, though, military escalation cannot achieve our goals in Afghanistan.
The Taliban insurgents are fighting against the corrupt Karzai regime that we are propping up. Sending more troops for longer periods of time makes us look like an occupying force in the eyes of the Afghan people. It’s the perfect recruitment tool for the Taliban.
The Afghan people remember the last time we intervened in their country. During the Cold War, we armed, financed, and trained the Mujahideen, who were fighting the Soviets (and would eventually become the Taliban, but that’s a whole other article). President Reagan actually praised the Mujahideen as “freedom fighters” (yes, the same Reagan that Republicans obsess over). We told the Afghans that everything would be better once they ousted communism, and used insurgents to overthrow the communist government. We helped them destroy their country in civil war, and then we left. We were quick to provide weapons to the anti-communists, but once they asked for schools, medical facilities, and roads, we said no.
What have we done to prove that we won’t do the same thing this time? The Afghans have no reason to trust us, so we need to give them one.
We need a new Marshall plan. If we want to prevent the spread of radicalism in Afghanistan, we need to commit to a substantial level of foreign aid for development. President Obama recognizes the need for development and for a civilian component of the mission, which is a very good thing. However, we haven’t been living up to it. Much of the aid we have delivered is either being wasted or used for military purposes. That’s unacceptable. That money needs to be spent on infrastructure, agriculture, and education. In March, Obama called for a “civilian surge” of State Department and USAID personnel to complement the increased number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Next week, many of those civilians will be deployed to Afghanistan, which is an important step. However, not long after calling for the civilian surge, the administration asked Defense Secretary Gates to identify 300 military personnel to fill jobs in Afghanistan intended for civilian experts, because not enough civilians were available. And although troops aren’t formally allowed to operate in Pakistan, the Pentagon has taken over certain functions there that have traditionally been controlled by the State Department.
These examples highlight an issue that threatens the success of the strategy in Afghanistan. We’re concentrating too much on Defense and not enough on the other two of the big Ds: Development and Diplomacy. We need a more comprehensive strategy. If we spent even just a quarter of the Defense budget for Afghanistan on aid for Development, and another quarter on domestic Homeland Security programs, we would be well on our way to achieving our goals in the region, and Americans would be much safer than we are today.
We don’t need to look like an occupying force. We need to BE an occupying force or we can never restore order and legitimacy to their government. Without a legitimate government there can be no development, no economic growth, and no improvement in social welfare for Afghanistan.
The harsh reality we will face after creating some sort of legitimate government will be owning up to the fact that their economy thrives on opium, a substance that is mostly illegal in the US and one that we fight to eradicate worldwide. Solving the disconnect of those two policy objectives may be our biggest challenge in fixing anything.
A government that exists because of an occupying force will never be legitimate.
“A government that exists because of an occupying force will never be legitimate.”
That is flat out wrong.
Take Iraq as an example. The people wanted democracy but couldn’t overpower oppressive leaders. The U.S. came in to help out, and Iraq is now on its way to having a legitimate government, as opposed to a tyranny.
Or Germany
Ian’s statement about the legitimacy of a government imposed by an occupying force is not flat out wrong, it just needs to be qualified along the lines: ‘a government that exists because of an occupying force MAY never — or at least in the medium term — be legitimate.’
There are governments or systems of governance imposed by occupation forces that were legitimate, like Germany as Kathleen suggested, or Japan, but there is a long list of illegitimate occupation governments. Like the Vichy government of France during WWII or most German imposed WWII governments or the earlier stages of communist rule in Eastern Europe or Japan’s government in China or Korea.
As for the need for aid and the use of nation-building, I agree, development efforts are needed for pacifying a country in the long term. But that is a political hot potato in Congress…
Saying definitively that “A government that exists because of an occupying force will never be legitimate” is flat out wrong, yes. The words “will never” make it so. If you want to change it to a statement that is correct, then fine, but it sill makes the original statement wrong. Anyway, just semantics.
I should have been more careful with my words – I meant specifically in Afghanistan, in its current condition.
Germany and Japan are always the examples given to support the idea of foreign-imposed democracy, because they’re basically the only two in modern history. There are countless other examples of horrible failures, as Paul said.
The only reason it was successful in Germany and Japan was because of the specific conditions of the time. We got lucky. Take Japan, for example: it became a successful democracy because the Emperor wanted to modernize and democratize the country. The people were always loyal to the Emperor, even after the war.
Oh, and Alec, please tell me you were joking about Iraq…
Fair enough, Ian. But the circumstances were entirely different in Germany than in Japan and the Allied imposition still worked. I’m not suggesting that the same procedure is applicable to Afghanistan, but I did take issue with the “will never be legitimate” claus. Thanks for revising your phrase.
The cost of failure is way too high. A terrorist vacuum in Afghanistan cannot be tolerated, even if it requires fighting a war of occupation.