Adam Sieff, Staff Writer
Ideology: Liberal | Writing from: Columbia University
There is actually a strong geopolitical argument to be made in favor of trying Khaled Sheikh Mohammed in the United States apart from any consideration of “justice” or “due process.”
The argument that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed ought to be prosecuted in a military tribunal and not a Manhattan courthouse seems to most strongly rely on the premise that, as an “act of war,” Mohammed’s crimes are ultravires the jurisdiction of any U.S. court. However, while 9/11 may certainly be classified an act of war, I am not sure why this substantiates the argument.
For one, over 214 Al Qaeda associates have already been brought to trial in the United States in the past 8 years for actions connected to the 9/11 attacks. 91 percent of these terrorists were subsequently convicted, while the other 9 percent mostly remained in custody for other charges. Fewer than 19 were deported for immigration violations and placed under significant surveillance.
Moreover, the study citing these figures notes that those not convicted or detained were mostly minor actors with only loose affiliations to terror groups and, consequently, unlikely recidivists. In other words, there is clearly an effective precedent already in place to try him in country, especially given the abundance of evidence held against Mohammed.
As an aside, I find it odd that those most likely to extol the virtues of “American exceptionalism” are also those most willing to sacrifice it to suit what former Chief Justice William O. Douglas once called “the passion and clamor of the time”—but I digress.
Having dismissed these concerns, there is actually a strong geopolitical argument to be made in favor of trying Mohammed in the United States apart from any consideration of “justice” or “due process.” From this perspective, a trial on U.S. soil marks a high profile, visual departure from the “waterboard era,” and helps bolster the credibility of America’s security signals. The value of credibility is not a moot point to be dismissed as weak-kneed liberal-speak pandering to European socialists, but indeed thecrucial factor in preventing unnecessary conflict.
In the logic of war, the credibility of a state’s guarantees–both to its allies and its enemies–is a currency as valuable as its power projection. This applies especially to a unipole, whose intentions affect nearly every corner of the globe, and whose power is unchecked internationally. Credibility is relevant in the forthcoming trial against Mohammed in that America’s adherence to its own deeply embedded standard of justice—whatever its merits—is at stake.
Abandoning such deeply held internal legal principles for the sake of expedience has two effects. First, it is a way to make our middle-power allies less comfortable with our not-so-deeply held security assurances to their states. As the logic goes, if America is willing to disregard its core Constitutional principles, what is to stop it from disregarding its superficial treaty obligations in an arena where there is no arm to exert retribution? This uncertainty can lead middle-power states to balance internally by increasing their own nuclear arms to hedge against the risk of American hegemony or withdrawal—an action that can lead to destabilizing regional arms race, security dilemma, and possibly preventative war.
Second, abandoning principles is a signal to disenchanted states not currently cooperating with the U.S. (e.g. Iran, North Korea) that American hegemony, already unlimited in capacity, is also unlimited in intent. This raises the costs of not proliferating and makes obtaining nuclear weapons—ultimately the only effective deterrent against such a unipole—more attractive in the immediate term. The ratcheting of these efforts creates a high incentive for America to pursue preemptive war as a means of preventing the diminution of its relative power.
To be sure, one trial will not suffice to effectuate either of these undesirable outcomes. Nevertheless, we already have a record of flaunting the Constitution and should take heed not to formalize such behavior normatively.
Ultimately, it is undeniable that Americans thirst for retributive justice. The comfort of an imagined leveling eases the pain of tragedy and is a catharsis that ought to be realized for the victims and relatives of those who perished, as well as for all Americans.
With the trial in U.S. Court, we will have such cathartic justice without undermining our security and risking another tragedy of perhaps even greater magnitude. With another war tribunal, however, we may be easing the “passions and clamors” of this time, at great cost to those of another.

“Fewer than 19 were deported for immigration violations and placed under significant surveillance.”
If ONE person, however remotely connected to 9/11 he was, was able to return to his home country and to al Qaeda free of charges, that’s one too many.
And do you think that trying KSM in civilian court will avoid future conflicts with terrorists? Your “logic of war” argument doesn’t apply, because the logic of war assumes that a war is taking place between two states, both interested in their own self-interest/preservation. These terrorist groups are not interested in preservation, nor do they represent any one state. And do you think that trying KSM in a military tribunal will inspire other terrorists? I suppose they’re all sitting around drinking tea, and when they hear KSM was sentenced to death by a “military tribunal” as opposed to a “civilian court,” that’s when they’ll decide an attack is in order? Terrorists hate us because we’re Americans, not because of how we treat other terrorists once we find them.
It’s a stretch to say that trying KSM in court rather than in a military tribunal adds to American exceptionalism or credibility at all.
Alex, three things:
(1) I disagree with you that one alleged terrorist purportedly involved in 9/11 released to his home country under scrupulous observation is “one too many.” Though you don’t make an argument to back this up, I’ll assume you fear he would return to terror activities. Now, as the report indicated, his likelihood of linking up with a terror cell is low, but, I would say, even if he does engage terror cells, he may provide our intelligence community tracking him with valuable insight. Ultimately, even with ACLU lawyers, someone who gets fully released without any additional charges is probably not a person of concern.
(2)Your point about non-state actors is a good one, but misunderstands its own logic. As you suggest, terrorists seek to kill Americans for many reasons and their desire to do so will not be deterred. Since the threat of terrorist attack is constant and almost completely inflexible, we shouldn’t bother to shape our policies to pressure that audience. Rather, we should enact policy that signals to state actors, whose postures ARE flexible, the nature of our credibility. To do otherwise could create additional problems we don’t at all need. So yes, you are right, terrorists don’t care what we do to Mohammed or any other terrorist—but if anything, that proves my point.
(3)I didn’t say it “adds to exceptionalism.” I don’t believe in the concept. My observation was that those who DO believe in exceptionalism on the basis of the exceptional quality of our laws, institutions and values, are least willing to actually uphold our laws, institutions and values.
*Alec, my bad. Noon is early for a Saturday.
Returning to terrorist activities would be one concern (I don’t really see a need to back this up, as I didn’t see any backup in your piece that a terrorist would not return, besides your saying he would be under surveillance, which isn’t sufficient). Letting this person get away with perpetrating an attack such as the one on 9/11, however “minor” his role was, would be another, unaddressed concern.
I guess we would disagree on your second point, in that you would say that state actors like Iran and North Korea have rational leaders who make rational decisions and have their states’ best interests in mind. I don’t think that’s the case.
Our laws and institutions, the ones that make America exceptional, don’t apply to terrorists (people who aren’t American and who commit acts of terror simply out of a hatred for those very same laws and institutions).
Dear Adam: From yours: “their desire to do so will not be deterred” It will be deterred when we pile up enough bodies of their friends, families, and co-workers. Pussy-footing around that sad fact delays the inevitable.
Pressuring al Quaida in order for us to try to ally with what you call “state actors” is what we’re doing now. It’s not direct enough, and it’s not effective for the long term.
Did you say the Pledge of Allegiance in school? Oaths are to men what constitutions are to countries. My guess is that you have about the same pride in your commitment to the Pledge as you do in the constitution.
What did the men who fought the Revolution die for?
Let’s get them pussy-footers out of here!
Did they say the pledge? Who knows, bet they never said the lords prayer, or nothin!
The men in the revolution died for standin in the way of guns! Occam’s razor!
O/D + O-er/D-er
There’s nothing wrong with slaughtering a bunch of radicals that want to kill Americans. What I’m saying is that, even after we build a mountain with the mangled rotted corpses of our enemies, it won’t deter them. Their motives are tied up into the dynamics of the modernizing middle east that we cannot control. This is not to say we shouldn’t root out terrorists, but rather that we shouldn’t let the war on terror distract us from other potential causes for conflict.
Unlike the terrorists, what we can control is the organized international system of states. We take for granted that nuclear conflict will never happen, and that American alliances and assurances to states across the globe are etched into stone–they aren’t. My point is that we ought to make policy decisions that understand how we can maintain that order and not jeopardize the highly possible (yet never discussed) risk of interstate great power war that would reduce 9/11 to a blip in world history.
That now having been said, what the hell do you mean by this: “Pressuring al Quaida in order for us to try to ally with what you call ‘state actors’ is what we’re doing now. It’s not direct enough, and it’s not effective for the long term.”
This is completely unrelated to anything I said. Hopefully I’ve now clarified my position. To be clear, my point is not a hippie bitchmoan about holding hands and singing kumbaya with the terrorists. It’s a strong rational position about preserving American security and power in the face of destabilizing threats–something I think you’d both agree with.
Dear Adam: From yours “even if we build a mountain… it won’t deter them” It deterred the Nazis. Is the nature of this enemy known to you as somehow fundamentally different?
The rest of yours is a re-hash of the idea that we should play to the second-class states. They don’t respect us anyway. They respect us the most when we project our power.