Adam Sieff, Staff Writer
Ideology: Liberal | Writing From: Columbia University
Two weeks ago, I lamented the demise of California on account of the state’s decayed social character. In particular, I attributed its gradual disintegration and present constitutional dysfunction to the fact that Tocquevillian communitarian mores have been largely eroded during the course of the twentieth century. This was a result I attributed to the state’s inherently individualistic emigrant population.
While I stand by my argument, it seems in hindsight somewhat myopic in its derivation of inviolable individualism. My previous treatment simply correlated the attitude to a state of character inclined towards risk-taking, as demonstrated by a willingness to absorb the costs of emigration without any guaranteed prospects for gain.
But, from a broader perspective, inviolable individualism seems to be derivative of a much larger process that Max Weber, writing about European civilization at the turn of the twentieth-century, observed as “rationalization”—the result of which is the indulgence of arbitrary and subjective aesthetic impulses.
To Weber, rationalization meant a historical drive towards a world in which “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.” The process has three parts.
First, “intellectualization,” which he described as the systemization of vast means-ends causal relationships that ultimately lead to the creation of a fully integrated logical system capable of predicting decision outcomes. Second, “objectification,” which involved the reduction of qualitative inputs (i.e. humans) into quantitative variables (i.e. statistics) that can be calculated along with other inputs in the integrated logical system above. Third, “control,” which, derived from the first two parts, can be summarized as the total sublimation of the individual to the rationalist system.
Weber extensively evaluated Calvinism and argued that the faith’s emphasis on industriousness and predestination precipitated rationalization in the 19th century as a means for believers to more effectively honor God and confirm their own salvation. In other words, the process of rationalization was initially value-creating.
Soon, however, Weber observed that the complex web of rationalized institutions came to stand without the support of religious doctrine, which was necessarily discarded as irrational and mystic. Consequently, the value-creating function of rationalization vanished and the systematized social environment became an “iron cage” of bureaucratic petrifaction and limited agency.
Science, the engine for rationalization, provided only a brief illusion of value-creation, but its self-defeating logic of discovery and experimental challenge made it a false prophet for value-starved moderns. Confined to a cage in the absence of systemized value-creation, the indulgence of aesthetic taste became the only meaningful activity available to the modern individual.
Leo Strauss, who was heavily influenced by Weber, argued similarly. Strauss believed that modern liberal democracy, because of its egalitarian spirit, inherently tends toward extreme relativism where meaningfully coordinated value-creation is not possible. This in turn leads to a state of hedonism and “permissive egalitarianism” (i.e. arbitrary indulgence of aesthetic impulse) that threatens social stability.
Now, these are gross simplifications of Weber and Strauss’ philosophies, but they nonetheless portend as both empirically and theoretically relevant in 2009. It would indeed seem that the rationalization of all spheres—including now the Internet—has led to the utter destruction of coordinated value-creation, leaving only the atomized and petty indulgence of aesthetic impulses as a means of living meaningfully.
Politically in a democratic society, this means that politicians operate on the whims of the self-indulgent masses, which have more or less direct control of the Political depending upon their specific circumstances. For example in California, this control is of the most vulgar and direct type. In the United States, shameless hedonism, though to a lesser extent, nevertheless reigns supreme.
True neo-conservatives argue that the solution is a dissemination of Platonic “noble lies” to pacify the masses, create order and stabilize the Political so that decisions about justice can later be assessed. The recently passed Irving Kristol, for example, was a staunch advocate of propagating nationalist myths and encouraging religious piety as instruments for social stability.
He was half-right. The problem with true neo-conservatism is two-fold.
First, the noble lies early neo-conservatives offered the American people were foolhardy and injurious to American interests. While encouraging general civil association may have been wise, fomenting religious fervency has never been conducive to stability. Moreover, indoctrinating the public with American triumphantism was liable to produce an aggressive war-mongering public inflamed with passion and prone to violence, sentiments that do not seem to favor stability, either nationally or internationally.
Second, the propagators came to believe their own propaganda. Whereas Strauss (and to a lesser extent Kristol) argued for ideological social manipulation, their immediate successors actually believed the gross lies about American exceptionalism and religiosity. In doing so, these second generation neo-cons like Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and Richard Perle genuinely pursued policies under Reagan and Bush that drained American power and risked American stability.
Because of their folly, the word “neo-conservative” has come to mean true belief in the noble lies envisioned by Strauss and Kristol. That populist demagogues like Sarah Palin and Michelle Bachmann now dare to call themselves neoconservatives is perhaps the greatest bastardization of the phrase yet, a complete and foul inversion of everything Strauss and Kristol had intended.
But Strauss and Kristol were also half right. Absent a prudent noble lie to unite the disenchanted masses, we will slowly devolve into disorder, dysfunction and collapse. For proof, we need only look at California, whose troubles have already been sufficiently catalogued in Part I.
Alternatively, of course, we can opt to construct a charismatic noble leader (like Pericles) to sate the crowd. In Barack Obama the country would seem to have one, but modern democratic politics simply make maintaining a seductive platform impossible to defend against the relentless barrage of vulgar demagoguery.
The moral vacuum in which we find ourselves avails too much to too many and every day we fail to invent a new moral order, we crawl nearer to that great pit of fallen civilizations crumbling beneath.
A new neo-conservatism must rise. One that is neither “liberal” nor “conservative” in their modern meanings, but which fundamentally understands that stability precedes justice. It must rise to destroy the injurious and foolishly fabricated moralities eviscerating our civilization, and it must construct new ones in their stead. That is the real challenge of this generation, and history will surely judge it so.
Who now dares to rise?

Just found my notes on Weber from my Social Theory class… will get back to you on this. It’s an interesting observation/deduction.
Are you a follower of Weber’s Social Theory?
It depends on what you mean by follower. I think his rationalization thesis was fairly prescient for diagnosing modernity, but, as I allude to here, I think that the American intellectuals who picked up on his theories did a poor job of addressing the problems he describes.
Adam,
I meant just that when I said “follower” that you agree with the theory, not necessarily how it has been implemented.
A few things you have left out which I think have an impact on your deduction.
First off, the Calvinist approach had a very strong emphasis on thrift and self-denial. These are thus contrary to your current argument that the Calvinistic approach, in and of itself, has led to this extreme individualism.
Also, if you are going to take a Weber-ian stance, you should also take a look at his Conflict Theory. He argues that conflict is an inevitable and permanent part of social life. Trying to remove this would be contrary to his beliefs.
His idea of rationality states that social life is increasingly organized principles of rational calculation, efficiency, and control (i.e. the “mystery” of life goes away).
The most “pure” form of rationalization under his definition is the modern Bureaucracy where organizational goals take precedence over the welfare of others.
In this, he argues that the “Iron Cage” of bureaucracy is what he is most afraid of. He is afraid that bureaucracy would be come overly powerful and would come to control people’s lives.
It seems to me, that by trying to create a new “moral order” is doing this exact thing, controlling people’s lives.
Your end decision seems to be based more on the idea of Marx where he believed that he *knew* what was best to be in the minds of workers. Weber, on the other hand, admits that he does not know what one thing is best, but rather we must look at each individual and how they *subjectively* interpret their own behavior.
History has shown that societies based upon an extreme view of Weber or Marxist principles inevitably fails. See France after the Revolution and a number of failed attempts at Marxism.
In 150 words you have managed to misunderstand me, Weber and Marx.
First, I’m not arguing that Calvinism leads to individualism, and neither does Weber. Calvinism leads to capitalistic bureaucratization, which expunges itself of Calvinism (see p. 123-5 of Protestant Ethic [Routledge]) when it is full formed. That leads to the individualism through the destruction of value-creation in all spheres.
First, I’m not arguing that Calvinism leads to individualism, and neither does Weber. For Weber, Calvinism led to capitalistic bureaucratization, which expunged itself of Calvinism (see p. 123-5 of Protestant Ethic [Routledge]) when it became fully formed. That leads to the individualism through the destruction of value-creation in all spheres.
Second, I never said I was a Weberian. I said I saw relevance in his diagnosis of modernity. His conflict theory is part of his prescription (or mere acceptance) of the problems he foretells. I never claimed to accept that.
Third, where have I said that some kind of social-control is not an objective?
Fourth, Marx sought to overthrow a very specific type of social control that is foreign to my argument. I’m not sure how he fits into this discussion beyond a basic mutual recognition of the existence of social manipulation. The type of control and what to do with it, however, differ variously among Marx, Weber, and myself.
Fifth, I am not arguing for a society based on Marxist or Weberian principles, whatever those are. Again, I don’t see how your point–even if valid, which remains unclear–relates at all to my discussion.
Finally, if history has told us anything, it is that the politicization of the crowd leads invariably to social collapse. How we placate the crowd in the context of democracy, not revolution or nihilistic disregard, is the task at hand.
I’m making arguments against your new neo-conservative ideas (whereby you seem to be arguing that the government should lie to its constituents to assert control)
This control has the same effect of the bureaucracy’s “Iron Cage”. They both limit an individual’s ability to function as an individual.
I find it interesting that you tell me you are “not arguing that Calvinism leads to individualism” and immediately describe:
Calvinism -> Capitalistic Bureaucratization -> destruction of value-creation -> Individualism
Marx is relevant as Weber was making arguments for social theory in opposition to Marx’s theories.
1. Well yeah, in an extended syllogism Calvinism would lead to individualism, sure. But that’s tenuous. You can recede ad infinitum making those sorts of “causal” claims.
2. My argument is what it is and I think we are both clear on what that amounts to.
Interesting fleshing out of Weber, Strauss…
One thought:
Amongst other things, my problem with this is as follows: Suppose one were to come to the conclusion that some sort of lie is necessary for “stability”. You’re problem with this is that the “neoconservatives” chose lies that were “foolhardy and injurious to American interests”. Secondly you say that that the “neoconservatives” came to believe their own propaganda…In doing so…genuinely pursued policies” based on these lies. To understand these as mistakes that the “neoconservatives” made, is itself a mistake. What would a “prudent noble lie” look like? If you are going to have an “elite” espouse a lie to the “masses” in order to placate them, you’re going to end up making policies consistent with or at least cognizant of that lie. And that’s, perhaps, exactly happened. To say that Reagan and Bush made what you see as bad policies, because they actually believed these lies is to avoid the reality that. No-one can know exactly what anyone else believes. Belief is internal. However, someone can certainly appear to believe something. My suggestion is that you don’t necessarily know that they believed these things but that they appeared to believe them. So whether or not Reagan or Bush believed in some myths about America, whether or not that acted on genuine beliefs or on what they saw as necessary illusions, they ACTED and made POLICY based on some ideas as if they believed it. This, as I understand it, is the POINT of the lie in the first place! Furthermore, as far as I know (and please correct me if im wrong) the “myths” of religion and nation were precisely the myths that Strauss suggested.
More will have to wait until a post-seminar meal perhaps, lol.
Also, if you’re interested or have the time, this is a decent and related documentary: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2798679275960015727#
Kyle makes good points. A ruling group must somehow credibly signal to the ruled group that the myths it has espoused are both “real” and “desirable” without actually pursuing those myths if they happen to be injurious.
I see two solutions to this:
(1) Create myths which are consonant with state interests. (The North Koreans have done this well through the autarkic doctrine of “juche.”)
(2) Justify neutral and prudent policies with allusions to otherwise potentially injurious myths. (This has been the American way until recently, when the bullshitters came to believe their own bullshit. Most of the founding fathers, for example, were desists or non-believers. Nevertheless, their public writings and oratories are saturated with biblical references and prophetic language).
As to your other point, while Strauss discussed religious and nationalist myths as potentially effective, it was Kristol who pursued them, and only his followers who bastardized/amplified them into injurious forms.
Religious and nationalist myths are not themselves malevolent, it is only the propensity (based on the historical record) for these forms to become abused and injected with fervor which gives me pause.
With or without religion/nationalism, I am confident, nonetheless, that (1) and (2) are achievable.