Emily Sieg, Staff Writer
Ideology: Social Democrat | Writing From: George Washington University

The theory of Democratic Peace states that democracies are not only the superior form of government, but also the least likely to wage war, particularly against each other.  When a democratic state does in fact declare war, the enemy is often portrayed as not only a tormentor of freedom, but as a threat to the culture of the democratic state itself.  The prevailing ideological remedy to belligerent states is thus the forced transformation of said undemocratic regime into a representative democracy.  From this argument, one could construe a hypothesis that if only all governments were democratic, then the world would be a more secure and peaceful place.

The theory stipulates that if Afghanistan, Iraq, the Soviet Union, Imperial Japan or Fascist Germany were democracies, then peace would reign.  The successful conversion of the Third Reich into the Federal German Republic is one of many causes for peace and economic recovery in Europe. Over the past sixty years, Japan has transformed from an aggressive absolute monarchy into a constitutional parliamentary monarchy, characterized by docility and soft power.  The former Eastern bloc states have, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, developed into what are now largely considered to be democratic republics and are therefore able to join the dovish European Union, which has stabilized the immediate region. The American War on Terror, aimed at turning Iraq and Afghanistan into obedient democratic states, however, has yet to produce the “desired” results.

For the purposes of a grander argument, the assumption will be held that Democratic Peace is actively pursued by democracies.  The foreign policy consequence of this assumption would be that democratic states attempt to impose democracies upon other states.  This article does not intend to debate the merits of this principle, but rather presumes that Democratic Peace is accepted by major foreign policy actors, namely, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. From this base, the more important case stands to be made: can democracy even be imposed upon a state?

In short, no; democracy cannot merely be drawn out of thin air and stamped onto an undemocratic entity.  The ill-conceived concept that some wicked regime could be simply and immediately converted into a thriving democracy is as ludicrous as assuming that a state could erupt into a raging revolution and thereafter bloom into a pure, blissful Marxist state.  The preconditions for democracy are varied, but ultimately there are universal traits that a state must have in order to successfully make the transition from the undemocratic to democratic: first, a democratic impulse which popularly exists (this is practically a tautology); second,  a memory of, or still existing, representative institutions to provide a template for democratic development; and thirdly, domestic stability and security in order to avoid violent outbreaks or revolutions.

Consider the development of democracy in the United States.  Having just fought for independence from the tyranny of a foreign monarch, a republic was virtually the only satisfying option given the American phobia of a dominant executive force. This relatively expeditious democratic transition stands in contrast to the political development of the United Kingdom.  The former British Empire has experienced uprisings and revolts (such as Cromwell and William & Mary), but generally speaking, it has had a steady evolution into a democratic state. This has required the constant conversion of older, non-democratic institutions into modern representative ones.  For both of these states, the democratic impulse developed domestically and was not the result of external pressures.  Furthermore, the UK and USA built upon pre-existing democratic institutions of representation in order to evolve into democracies.  In fact, these democracies came into existence despite foreign, undemocratic influences.

Turn then to a state such as imperial Germany, whose strong Prussian army in the late 19th century was the primary cause for any unified nation at all.  This highly militarized and authoritarian regime included an oppressive Kaiser and a Chancellor, who together exercised complete authority.  Though an elected parliament existed long before 1919, it had virtually no influence on governmental affairs.  The declaration of the post-WWI Weimar Republic was greeted by a population unaccustomed to decentralized power that was skeptical of democracy, let alone a “social democracy.”  Lacking the crucially important popular support for democratic institutions, the Weimar Republic subsequently transformed into the dictatorial Third Reich. Instead of being democratic, Hitler’s Third Reich had a power structure similar to that of the previous Second Reich under Wilhelm II.  Only after utter destruction,  undeniable defeat and occupation, dissimilar to the capitulation after WWI, did a domestic inclination for democracy develop under the auspices of the Western Allied powers, which was based upon the proportional representational system of the Weimar Republic.  The unrelenting flow of Eastern emigrants and evermore disparate standards of living foretold the disintegration of the Eastern German courtship to Communism and the Soviet Union in general, but that is another case study for another day.

The ultimate problem with democracy, and why this article maintains that the imposition of democracy is no longer practically feasible, is that the means to create an imposed democratic impulse are tremendously costly.  As in the case of either the Third Reich or Imperial Japan, the former regime, military forces and popular mentality had to be completely annihilated.  From the Stunde Null (or “zero hour”) the German desire for democratic change after World War II was nurtured by the Allies, but drew its roots in the historical parliamentary institutions, which date back as far as 1867.  In the case of Japan, the lack of any parliamentary system before the creation of their democracy has had the effect that only in 2009 has there been successful political opposition and what one could truly call “democracy.”

Drawing these conclusions into the present, it is understandable why the current missions in Afghanistan and Iraq show little promise. History does not offer much in the way of democratic traditions in these countries and the current sprouts of democracy are unnatural.  There exist extremely strong currents against the democracy that, predominantly, the United States has attempted to impose there.  Therefore, the possibility to reduce either of these countries to the status of post-war Germany or Japan is non-existent, and the assumption that the same democratic progression can be expected is consequently unrealistic.  A similar process would necessitate such brutality that the democratic processes of the United States itself would not allow it, regardless of the international abhorrence for the United States and the regional instability that would ensue.  Furthermore, the United States cannot realistically achieve such goals unilaterally, and it cannot expect to establish the fresh, stable foundations needed to start the democratic state-building process in either of these countries. Moreover, the United States will not even remain in either of these places for the extended period of years necessary to provide the stability and security that an emerging democracy requires.

The purely external imposition of democracy, therefore, is not possible.  Democracies demand decades, even centuries, to develop domestically and independently.  If a democracy is desired within the frame of only a few years (as the United States desires in Iraq and Afghanistan and desired previously in Germany), then a history of democratic traditions is necessary in addition to the complete eradication of the previous regime and the maintenance of security and stability within the nascent democratic state.  Therefore, the imposition of the democratic model, though a precondition to democratic peace, is not a viable foreign policy objective.